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#### ARTICLES:

- (1) Analysis of North Korea's nuclear test by David Straub, associate professor at Johns Hopkins University: US needs to review North Korea policy

YOMIURI (Page 9) (Full)  
October 28, 2006

Question: What was the significance of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's Asia trip?

Straub: I think the Secretary's Asia visit produced a certain level of good results, for example, six-party talks member nations (excluding North Korea) were able to move closer together and that Japan and South Korea, allies of the United States, reaffirmed that they were under the US nuclear umbrella. It was regrettable that what the US was considering as sanctions against North Korea was misunderstood, and the Secretary had to explain to Asian leaders that the United States had no intention to take such measures as a naval blockade that it imposed when the Cuban missile crisis occurred.

Question: Is there a possibility that ship inspections might develop into a military clash?

Straub: I think the US government bears in mind that cargo inspections will be conducted when ships enter ports. There is an increased risk, however. There is a possibility that tensions might grow over an accidental exercise of force during a ship inspection.

Question: China has remained reluctant about ship inspections.

Straub: I don't think China will cooperate in carrying out large-scale inspections of cargo ships. China neither wants North Korea to possess nuclear weapons nor the Korean Peninsula to become unstable. China has its limits when it comes to putting pressure on North Korea.

Question: What will happen next?

Straub: It is unlikely that North Korea will return to the six-party

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talks unconditionally. There seems to be no doubt that the North will conduct a second nuclear test. Neighboring countries must cooperate in implementing the UN Security Council resolution. It is necessary for them to review their policies through discussions.

Question: What should the United States do?

Straub: It's better for the United States to review its approach toward North Korea. The president should appoint a policy coordinator and present a roadmap containing a carrot-and-stick policy to Pyongyang. If the United States fails or does not make efforts, it will not be able to gain the full cooperation of other countries.

Question: Do you think if the Democratic Party wins the mid-term elections, there will be an impact on the US policy toward North Korea?

Straub: The Bush administration will probably encounter increasing criticism, but the president has strong foreign policy power. President Bush has a strong personal view that North Korea is an evil regime. He might have an even stronger conviction now that his administration's hard-line policy toward the North was correct.

(2) My view of North Korea situation by David Straub, professor at Johns Hopkins University and former country director for Korean Affairs at the US Department of State: Direct negotiations well worth a try

MAINICHI (Page 9) (Full)  
October 31, 2006

Interviewer: Toshihiko Kawahara, Washington

President Bush actually detests (General Secretary) Kim Jong Il and regards his regime as "evil." He thinks it is immoral for the United States to deal with evil and that it is useless to hold talks with an unreliable sort like him. Mr. Bush would think his righteousness has now been proved by (the North's) nuclear test.

The Bush administration's pendulum has tilted even further toward

hardliners. They believe that financial sanctions against a Macao bank, for instance, would deal a sizable blow to the North Korean leadership and help put pressure on it to give up its nuclear programs. Regime change is not on the US government's policy agenda, but the fact is that a number of senior administration officials are hoping such would happen. The US will likely step up its sanctions.

The US had no intention of holding talks with North Korea in a serious manner even before the nuclear test. All the US has done to date has been to attend the six-party talks and declare its policy there. This stance will not change. If North Korea were to return to the six-party talks, the US would accept that, because Washington expects the forum to give an opportunity to other participating countries to pressure the North.

(General Secretary) Kim Jong Il in pushing for nuclear development feels three threats: 1) from the North Korea people themselves, who are isolated by him from the international community; 2) from South Korea, which has defeated him in political and economic competition; and 3) the US. It seems to me that the Bush administration's tough line has made it instead easier for North Korea to decide to explode a nuclear device.

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If my reasoning proves to be correct, it would be extremely difficult to persuade the North to abandon its nuclear programs. But Pyongyang still hopes to have a direct dialogue with Washington. Such talks are well worth a try for the US. In order to obtain sufficient endorsement to sanctions measures against North Korea and America's policy toward it, Washington needs to show flexibility when it tries to persuade North Korea.

With no concessions expected from North Korea and given that the Bush administration's term of office expires in two years, it is highly probable that the North will conduct another nuclear test. The most desirable scenario would be for Pyongyang not to conduct a second nuclear test before a new US administration, which is more likely to assume a pragmatic approach to the issue, will come into office, and the possibility of military conflict on the Korean Peninsula is minimized.

Will North Korea explode another nuclear device and continue developing nuclear weapons? What will happen to the issues of nuclear weapons and missiles? The Mainichi Shimbun in this series interviews experts on the Korean Peninsula situation from a number of countries.

(3) What promoted North Korea to hurry nuclear test?

SANKEI (Page 15) (Abridged slightly)  
October 28, 2006

By Toshiyuki Shikata

Three viewpoints to fathom North Korea's aim

The series of ballistic missile launches by North Korea was linked to its nuclear test. The North has been pushing ahead with two projects simultaneously: One is to develop ballistic missiles (Taepodong) capable of reaching the United States, and the other is to develop warheads small enough to fit onto ballistic missiles. The two projects are intended to realize Pyongyang's political goal of dragging the United States to direct bilateral talks with North Korea.

But the test launches of ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States failed, and the underground nuclear test, too, seemed short of total success. Why did North Korea rush to test missiles and a nuclear device still in the development stage with low credibility?

That can be explained by three reasons. First, the North was gradually suffering from America's economic sanctions and a lack of hard currency under the international community's watchful eye on the country's weapons exports to the Middle East.

Second, although the six-party talks have been an opportune arena for the North to buy time, the framework made it difficult to elicit direct bilateral talks from the United States.

The United States has been preoccupied with blocking Iran from possessing nuclear weapons, while leaving North Korean affairs to China, which cannot let that country fall. North Korea needed to acquire a nuclear capability ahead of Iran.

#### Power struggle in North Korea

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Third, a power struggle dividing North Korea has been out of control, a factor often overlooked.

There is a struggle between the Korean Workers Party "open-door" civilian group urging General Secretary Kim Jong Il to take a Chinese-style open-door policy and the military xenophobic group (upholding Juche), which opposes the former for fence sitting.

The Korean People's Army fears that once the country adopts a Chinese-style open-door policy, the North will become a satellite of China, with its all areas -- from politics to economics to diplomacy to the military -- under China's influence.

Exchanges between the People's Liberation Army and the Korean People's Army have not been active. China has conducted large-scale joint drills with Russia but not with North Korea. In terms of equipment, North Korea's dependence on China is also limited. The North's equipment is overwhelmingly connected with weaponry made in the former Soviet Union.

The Korean People's Army, which prioritizes Juche and the military-first policy, apparently wants to keep its distance from China at least on the military front.

In the wake of North Korea's announcement on its nuclear test, the United Nations has adopted a sanctions resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Top diplomats of Japan, the United States, China, Russia, and South Korea also discussed how to deal with the situation, crisscrossing the globe.

North Korea going nuclear would be followed by Iran, a major anti-Western Islamic state with tremendous oil reserves, bringing a sea change to the strategic environment surrounding the Middle East. Such anxiety prompted the international community to take concerted action.

Unlike North Korea's case, Iran going nuclear might spill over to Europe, where there is no non-nuclear zone treaty.

Even if North Korea becomes a nuclear power, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are unlikely to follow suit. Chances are extremely slim that Pyongyang would use nuclear weapons against China and Russia. South Korea is also convinced that the North will not use them on their fellow Koreans. The North could aim them at the United States to send out a political message, not a militarily signal. This means that Japan will be the only country directly exposed to the nuclear threat from North Korea.

#### Nuclear debate in Japan

There are calls for a nuclear debate in Japan. They are not for arming Japan with nuclear weapons but for an active debate on what kind of "power" other than nuclear weapons Japan should possess in order to have a strong voice in the international community.

They are asking how Japan can secure "power" in a future international community where neither checkbook diplomacy nor being friendly will work.

Clinging to America's nuclear deterrent must not be the only answer. Is having the ability to collect, analyze, and send out intelligence by utilizing a large number of reconnaissance satellites and

monitoring signals an answer? Does Japan need to have cutting-edge technology? Or Japan perhaps needs to have the moral power to convince major powers that often rely on double standards.

As the only victim of atomic bombings, Japan has opted to remain a nonnuclear power although it has the technical ability to go nuclear, and that in itself is the largest deterrent, in my view.

Caution must be practiced so that Japan will not be regarded as a threat simply because there are calls for a nuclear debate in the country.

(4) View of reporter assigned to Prime Minister Abe on his one month in office: He should speak his own words while listening to diverse opinions

By Haruka Osugi

TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 20) (Full)  
October 31, 2006

On the night of Sept. 27 soon after his administration was inaugurated, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met with reporters attached to the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) and said nervously:

"I keenly sense the grave responsibility I now have. Since it is important for politicians to achieve results, I will devote my energies to making results so that the public will laud my efforts."

One month has passed since then. Prime Minister Abe has handled his job in a steady fashion. However, I sense now once in a while that he has lost the modesty that he had immediately after assuming office.

I compared the number of visitors to Prime Minister Abe had in the first month to that of Junichiro Koizumi during his first month as premier. Koizumi had 24 meetings all told with administrative vice-ministers, the top officials of the ministries and agencies, but Abe held only five meetings with such officials. He has apparently been trying to demonstrate his policy stance of distancing himself from the bureaucracy by indirectly receiving their reports through the chief cabinet secretary. I am concerned about whether he can make appropriate decisions by not getting information firsthand, but relying on an aide most of the time.

The only chance for us as reporters to sense his character is at meetings. Reporters questioned Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and his predecessors while walking alongside them. Koizumi, however, set up a place for the reporters to question him. Abe has taken over the Koizumi style. However, his secretary often breaks off our meetings. We understand that the prime minister is very busy, but he should not ignore our questions. We see him as cold to us.

Prime Minister Koizumi responded to our questions twice a day. Abe intends to reduce the press meetings to once a day. When asked about his reason for the reduction, he just said: "I will always responded to questions by reporters covering me once a day, speaking before the public."

One high government official said: "Jumping to conclusions is not good." The prime minister is not the only person to produce

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achievements. I would like Prime Minister Abe to speak to the public in his own words, while listening to a variety of views. I would like him to produce better results that way.

(5) Editorial -- Kono statement on military comfort women: The heart of dispute is whether there was "transportation of women for forced labor as sex slaves"

We wonder why those remarks are problematic?

The remarks in question are the ones recently made by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Hakubun Shimomura, in which he indicated the need to study the so-called "Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono's statement on military comfort women."

The opposition parties, including the Democratic Party of Japan (Minshuto), cite a contradiction between Shimomura's remarks and Prime Minister Abe's Diet replies, in which Abe stated he would follow the Kono statement, to criticize the government as there being a discord in the cabinet.

Shimomura's remarks were specifically something like: "Personally, there is a need to study the facts more carefully, and we should take time to collect objective and scientific knowledge and consider the results (of the studies)."

The Kono statement offered an apology and expressed remorse to former military comfort women. The premise for the statement was the acknowledgment of the fact that the former Imperial Japanese Army and police authorities "transported women for forced labor." This acknowledgment was approved at a cabinet meeting without conducting a thorough investigation because the Japanese government was under pressure from the South Korean government to admit that there had been transportation of women for forced labor as sex slaves.

A threshold of the comfort-women issue was some nationwide dailies' false reports describing the women volunteer corps organized under the labor mobilization system as a means to "hunt military comfort women." To add to that, even a Japanese who "confessed" that he gathered comfort women emerged, but this confession, too, was a fabricated story. No direct materials showing transportation of women for forced labor as sex slaves have been found so far even in the government's investigation.

Obviously, the Kono statement was not a product generated from a social, scientific approach in line with objective data. Rather, it was the result of giving excessive diplomatic consideration to South Korea, whose public was filled with anti-Japanese sentiment. Heeding these circumstances, Shimomura indicated the need to study the statement.

Nonetheless, if Minshuto and other parties challenge Shimomura's remarks, they should first show what is their view about the question of whether there was transportation of women for forced labor, the crux of the Kono statement, and then should pursue the government.

Prime Minister Abe stated he abides by the Kono statement, but at the same time he commented that "No data supporting" transportation of women for forced labor as sex slaves "have been found even now,"

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by employing the expression of "enforcement in a narrow sense." Shimomura's remarks are not contradictory to Abe's replies.

The government's view is not necessarily the golden rule. It is only natural to correct it if there is something wrong with it.

The point is the facts.

Namely, was there the fact of transportation of people by the military or police authorities for forced labor? Aside from political calculations or excessive diplomatic consideration, this question should be considered; for that reason, it should be entrusted to historians and other experts' research.

As a result of the research, if no facts demonstrating transportation for forced labor are found, the Kono statement must be revised

